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15.1  Urban Patronage: Its Common History 
One of the most notable political changes of  the past hundred years is the 
rise and fall of  urban patronage machines. In  most years between 1865 and 
1930, patronage machines ruled many large cities-St.  Louis, New Orleans, 
Los  Angeles,  Minneapolis,  Pittsburgh,  Philadelphia, New  York,  Chicago, 
and Detroit-and  many smaller cities and towns, too. Patronage increased 
from  affecting half  of  the  thirty cities  surveyed by  M.  Craig  Brown  and 
Charles N. Halaby  in  1870 to affecting over 70 percent between  1890 and 
1910. Thereafter it  declined to affecting 65 percent in  1930, and declined 
further, affecting half after 1940. But machines controlled few urban govern- 
ments before 1850 or after 1975.  ’ 
The common explanation ties the rise and fall of patronage machines to the 
rise and fall of immigrant urban electorates. Patronage commonly is defined 
as “a political currency with which to ‘purchase’ political activity and political 
responses” from “voters whose loyalty was ensured by  an organizationally 
created web of jobs, favors, and payoffs” “distributed at the discretion of po- 
litical leaders.”2 Patronage jobs bought the votes of immigrants, who were 
Earlier versions of the paper benefited from presentations to the Washington Area Economic 
History Society, the Public Choice Society, and the Cliometrics session at the 1988 Allied Social 
Sciences Association meeting in New York:  seminars at the University of  Montreal, Columbia 
University, Dartmouth College, and the University of Chicago; and comments by Moms P.  Fior- 
ina, Hugh Rockoff, Gordon Tullock, John Wallis, and James Q. Wilson. 
1. M. Craig Brown and Charles N. Halaby, “Machine Politics in America,  1870-1945,”Jour- 
nal of  Interdisciplinary History, 17 (Winter 1987), p. 598; the thirty cities are listed in fn. 3, pp. 
588-89.  See also Bradley Robert Rice, Progressive Cities (Austin, 1977); Lincoln Steffens, The 
Shame of  the Cities (New York, 1904). 
2. Quotes are from Frank J. Sorauf, “The Silent Revolution in Patronage,” Public Administro- 
tion Review, 20 (Winter 1960). p. 28; Brown and Halaby, “Machine Politics,” p. 596; and James 
Q. Wilson, “The Economy of Patronage,” Journal of  Political Economy, 69 (Aug. 1961), p. 370. 
See also V.  0. Key, Jr., “The Techniques of  Political Graft in the United States” (Ph.D. Disserta- 
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“ignorant and pliable voters” or “primitive people,  such as the South Italian 
peasants,”3 who were accustomed to and wanted “quasi-feudal relationships” 
with their machine and were not accustomed  “to seek the good of  the com- 
m~nity.”~  Entrenched  with  bought  votes, the patronage  machine  sold “city 
jobs, business  opportunities, easements from city regulations,  and gifts” to 
businessmen, so that  “the boss, rich  with graft,  . . . and having  doled out 
many a favor to businessmen, . . . could draw upon the world of private busi- 
ness as well as the public payroll to provide jobs for his  constituent^."^ 
Nonetheless,  many  historians  call  patronage  good  in  its time:  “city  ma- 
chines . . . have generally been viewed positively  as integrators of  the poor 
and providers of  social welfare  services to immigrant  populations.”6 At the 
same time, most historians agree that patronage was wasteful, because patron- 
age workers loafed between elections and patronage bosses accepted shoddy 
or overbilled construction of  public works.’  Some, however, argue that “the 
practice of distributing patronage to voters in exchange for political support 
was less costly . . . and less inconsistent with the [desired] principles of  luis- 
sezfuire than would  [have been alternative governmental responses]  . . . to 
certain [redistributive] demands” of  voters or, in other words, that the largesse 
of  patronage machines absorbed or deflated revolutionary impulses of immi- 
grants, much as today’s food subsidies immobilize the urban poor of less de- 
veloped countries.* 
Finally, most historians believe that patronage waxed as Protestant morality 
and self-reliance waned, so that patronage flourished during the massive im- 
migrations of southern and eastern Europeans around 1900, and died out after 
war and the reforms of  the Progressives-slowing  immigration,  increasing 
access to education, replacing patronage with merit appointment to political 
tion, University of Chicago, 1934), p. 68; and Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American 
Srare (Cambridge, Mass.,  1982). p. 48. 
3. James Bryce, “Setting the Stereotype,” in  Urban Bosses, Machines,  and Progressive  Re- 
formers, Bruce  M.  Stave,  ed. (Lexington, 1972). p. 9. Jane  Addams,  “Why the Ward  Boss 
Rules,” in Bosses, Machines, andReformers, Bruce M. Stave, ed., p. 11. 
4. Robert Merton, “The Latent Functions of the Machine,” in Urban Bosses, Machines. and 
Progressive Reformers, Bruce M. Stave, ed. (Lexington, 1972). p. 30. Edward C. Banfield and 
James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge, Mass., 1967). p. 41. 
5. The first quote is from Aaron A. Rhodes, “Material and Nonmaterial Incentives in Political 
Machines,” European Journal of Sociology, 25 (May 1984). p. 28. He documents that this is the 
traditional view of patronage-votes  for jobs and bent laws for money-but  argues that closeness 
to power and charisma of  politicians also motivate voters and political workers (pp. 28-53).  The 
second quote is from Richard Hofstadter, The Age ofReform (New York,  1955). p.  184. For a 
confirming account of the Tweed Ring’s methods,  see Seymour J. Mandelbaum, Boss  Tweed‘s 
New York (New York, 1965), pp. 46-104. 
6. James C. Scott, “Political Clientelism: A Bibliographical Essay,” in Friends, Followers, and 
Factions, Steffen W.  Schmidt, Laura Guasti, Carl H. Lande, and James C. Scott, eds. (Berkeley, 
1977). p. 494; Arthur S. Link and Richard L. McCormick,  Progressivism  (Arlington Heights, 
7. Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, p. 41, write that “the pay for [patronage jobs] . . . is 
8. Martin Shefter, Polirical CrisislFiscal  Crisis (New York, 1985), p. 16, writing about Boss 
1983). pp. 9-17. 
greater than the value of  the public services performed.” 
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jobs, and making ballots simpler and voting secret-reduced  the influence of 
culturally divergent voters. The common understanding of patronage, in sum, 
is that political machines  were “supported  by  continuing immigration,  sus- 
tained  by  patronage,  fattened  by  loot,”  and  in  the  end  were  felled  by  de- 
termined  Progressive  ~irtue.~  Historians  of  patronage  view  its  demise  as 
progress. lo 
But the common understanding of patronage rests upon false theories and 
facts. In theory, voters generally are seeking private rather than public better- 
ment: private betterment accrues to oneself, but public betterment accrues to 
all. Because public betterment is a public good, too few citizens will cast their 
votes for the common good because they expect others to do so. They expect 
to reap the rewards of public betterment without their private sacrifice. Thus, 
voters, in a rational manner, must be ignorant about politics, because politics 
by definition is about public goods which accrue to individuals with or with- 
out their participation or about minuscule negative transfers each too small to 
justify fighting.” Only large transfers shared with few others are worth learn- 
ing about and getting in politics. Thus, the Progressive explanation of politi- 
cal change, which relies upon the mass of voters becoming more sophisticated 
and a large elite devoting effort to public betterment, is suspect in theory.I* 
9. Quote from Arthur  Mann, “When Tammany was  Supreme: Introduction,” in  William L. 
Riordon, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall (New York, 1963). p. xv. In addition to the references above, 
for the traditional view that “attributes the rise in [political machines]  to the social and polit- 
ical disarray accompanying urbanization, industrialization, and immigration; and the decline . . . 
to Progressive reforms and the gradual assimilation of the foreign born,” see M. Craig Brown and 
Charles N. Halaby, “Machine Politics,” p. 610, and references at pp. 588, fn. 2, and 589, fn. 4; 
and (in chronological order): M. I. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Party System in the United 
States (New York,  1910); Sorauf, “The Silent Revolution,” p. 31; Hofstadter, Age ofReform, pp. 
9, 179-86,  257-71;  Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., “Bosses, Machines, and Ethnic Groups,” Annals of 
the American Academy  of Political and Social Science: City Bosses and Political Machines,  18 
(May  1964), pp.  27-39;  Banfield and Wilson,  Ciry Politics, pp. 40-41,  123, 330-46;  L. E. 
Fredman,  The Australian Ballot  (East Lansing,  1968); Sam Bass Warner, Jr., The Privafe City: 
Philadelphia  in  Three Stages of its Growth (Philadelphia,  1968), pp. 54-56;  Nathan Glazer and 
Daniel P.  Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Por  (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), pp. 221-29;  Barry D. 
Karl, The  Uneasy State  (Chicago, 1983), pp.  16-33.  Raymond E.  Wolfinger,  “Why Political 
Machines Have Not Withered Away,” The Journal of Politics, 34 (May 1972),  pp. 365-98,  agrees 
that this is the traditional view, but feels it is “inadequate” (p. 386). Amy Bridges, A Ciry in the 
Republic: Antebellum New York and the Origins of Machine Politics, (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), 
p. 4, summarizes the traditional view, but argues against its post-Civil War dating. Nathaniel H. 
Leff articulates the common identification of corruption with culture: To  ’  is deeply rooted 
in  the psychological and social structure of  the countries where it exis  Corruption will 
persist until universalistic norms predominate over particularistic attitudes,’’  in “Economic Devel- 
opment Through Bureaucratic Corruption,”  American Behavioral Scienrist. 8 (Dec. 1964),  p. 13. 
10. Daniel P.  Moynihan, “When the Irish Ran  New York,” The Reporter (8 June 1961), pp. 32- 
44. See also Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils: A History of the Civil Service Reform Move- 
ment, 1865-83 (Urbana, 1961). p. 257; Mann, “When Tammany was Supreme.” 
1 1. See Mancur Olson, The Logic of  Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass., 1965); and Joseph 
D. Reid, Jr., “Understanding Political Events in the New Economic History,”Journal of Economic 
History, 37 (June 1977), pp. 302-28. 
12. Might one argue that the fact that voting currently is more prevalent among those more 
educated offers support for the Progressive explanation that the best of the electorate shouldered 
their responsibility to improve elections? We think not. Today participation is heaviest in national 
and least in local elections, while outcomes’ differential impacts on voters are least in national and 430  Joseph D. Reid, Jr., and Michael M. Kurth 
The Progressive explanation is suspect in fact, as well. The Progressives 
identified patronage  machines  with the uneducated  and unprincipled  immi- 
grants clustered in growing cities: “a great city is the best soil for the growth 
of a Boss, because it contains the largest masses of manageable voters as well 
as numerous offices and plentiful opportunities  for jobbing.”I3 But the Pro- 
gressives were mistaken.  Patronage and political machines did not arise first 
in response to post-Civil  War immigrants. Amy Bridges reports that the Fed- 
eralists appointed 1,500 faithful workers to positions in New York City in the 
1780s and  1790s, or one patronage  appointment  for every  three  ~0ters.I~ 
Under Tammany’s Boss Tweed in the  1860s, only one in eight voters would 
be patronage  appointments. l5  Furthermore,  credit for the first political  ma- 
chine generally is given to Martin Van Buren, who created and managed the 
“Albany Regency” to trade votes at the federal level for largesse for his state 
and largesse at the local level for votes to the Regency  after 1820.16  Thus, 
patronage antedates large cities filled with recent immigrants. 
Because attribution of patronage machines to post-Civil  War  immigrants 
and cities is questionable in theory and fact, we propose a new understanding. 
We  think that the rise and fall of patronage machines mirrors a fall and rise in 
the incomes and homogeneity of voters that made patronage more, then less, 
efficient. Our first step is to build an appropriate model of government. 
15.2  A Model of Government 
We  start from agreement with the Chicago machine boss who said that a 
political organization is “just like any sales organization trying to sell its prod- 
uct.”’’ It wants to produce cheaply while reaping maximum reward from the 
difference between  sales value and production cost. Therefore,  we model a 
political  organization  as any other business,  as an association  of  inputs  in 
hope of profit. Our political firm, like a business firm, is an institution defined 
by  a  set  of transactions,  rather than a  set of  specific functions.  As  with  a 
business firm, which transactions are accomplished in the political  firm and 
greatest in local elections (federal taxes and expenditures vary less than local taxes and expendi- 
tures in response to elections). So even though the educated are more likely to vote, they are not 
voting‘where their votes count most.  This suggests that voting involves motives other than a 
means of enacting preferred platforms. 
13. James Bryce, “Setting the Stereotype,” in Urban Bosses, Machines, and Progressive Re- 
formers, Bruce M. Stave, ed. (Lexington,  1972), p. 4. 
14. Amy Bridges, City in the Republic, p. 132. 
15. Morton Keller, Aflairs ofstate (Cambridge, Mass., 1977),  p. 239, cited in Shefter, Political 
Crisis, p.  16. 
16. Although,  Van  Buren may have just grasped and elaborated at the state level what was 
commonplace at ‘‘a ‘grass roots’ level in almost every locality”; see Alvin Kass, Politics in New 
York State, 1800-1830  (Syracuse, 1965). pp. 9, 55-56,  and passim. Also see Skowronek, New 
American State, pp. 24-26,  who argues that patronage parties were the efficient means to present 
diverse local interests to state and federal legislators before the Civil War. 
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which are conducted in the marketplace depends upon the costs of  internal 
metering and monitoring versus the costs of search and negotiation in the mar- 
ket. The only constraint is that whatever a political firm does must maximize 
political profit, or ultimately it will be defeated or deserted in electoral com- 
petition.  Accepting the metaphor that a political firm is an optimizing entity 
devoted to the profitable supply of political outcomes, then if  political firms 
differ from private firms, it is because of difference in the transactions under- 
taken, products provided,  technologies used, or environments. We  need to 
evaluate each in turn. 
Political transactions are  more  complex and  costly  than private  market 
transactions. In private market transactions, payment of  precisely so  many 
dollars secures immediately some (comparatively) well-defined good or ser- 
vice for the purchaser. But politicians trade promises and ambiguous out- 
comes for cash or votes of uncertain worth and not delivered simultaneously.I9 
Accordingly, it is hard for voters to know what politicians have done and it is 
hard for politicians to know what voters have and want done. Thus, successful 
political exchange requires extensive metering and  monitoring  of  the  ex- 
change itself, as well as of  the design and production processes. Since the 
function of  a firm is to reduce transaction costs, it follows that transacting 
bulks larger for a political firm than for a market firm.20 
18. Admittedly, our terms here are imprecisely defined. Political profit is some mix of votes 
and cash (which in turn can be spent on comforts for politicians or on benefits for voters). Political 
competition will drive politicians to buy votes from the minimum winning coalition expected to 
be most profitable, served with the most efficient political organization. A likely coalition would 
be those whose votes were cheap and who would not be upset by favors sold to big spenders: poor 
employees for votes and big employers for big spenders, say. For the transactions theory of the 
firm, see R. H. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,”Economica, new series 4 (l937),  pp. 386-405; 
Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs and Economic Organiza- 
tion,” American Economic Review, 62 (Dec. 1972). pp. 777-95;  M. Jensen and W.  Meckling, 
“Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure,” Journal of 
Financial Economics, 3 (1976), pp. 305-60.  For an enlightening survey, see Beth V.  Yarbrough 
and Robert M. Yarhrough, “The Transactional Structure of the Firm: A Comparative Survey,’’ 
Journal  ofEconomic Behavior and Organization, 10 (July  1988), pp.  1-28.  Gary Becker, “A 
Theory of  Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,” Quarterly Journal  of 
Economics,  98 (1983), pp.  371-400,  presents a formally complete model of a legislature as a 
profit-maximizing institution with a minimum votes constraint. Barry Weingast and William Mar- 
shall, “The Industrial Organization of Congress,” Journal of  Political Economy, 96 (Feb.  1988), 
pp. 132-61, explicitly discuss a legislature (Congress) as a multi-task firm. 
19. Too few or too many votes purchase little for a political firm, just the right amount of votes 
gives optimal control of taxing, spending, and regulation. William F. Riker, The Theory ofPoliti- 
cal Coalitions (New Haven, 1962), as modified by George J. Stigler, “Economic Competition and 
Political Competition,” Public Choice, 13 (Fall 1972), pp. 91-106,  implies that political control 
increases and average benefit declines as coalition size rises. Frequently politicians make it harder 
to determine if promises have been honored. For instance, members of Congress often gut a law 
so that the outcome diverges from its title and then vote the title. See Moms P.  Fiorina, Congress, 
Keystone of  the Washington Establishment  (New Haven,  1977). See also Reid, “Understanding 
Political Events.” 
20. This is not to say that private market transactions are not complex, uncertain, ambiguous, 
and open-ended, as argued forcefully by Oliver Williamson, Jr., in Markets and Hierarchies (New 
York, 1975), only that they are simpler than political market transactions. 432  Joseph D. Reid, Jr., and Michael M. Kurth 
For a better illumination of  the issues, we classify political exchanges into 
two types, direct and general. In direct exchanges goods go from the political 
firm directly to the constituent in individual units. General exchanges provide 
goods and services that benefit all who qualify and avail themselves of  them. 
Consider a political exchange of  apples for (past or future) votes. In a direct 
exchange the voter requests and receives an apple from a politician or a public 
employee. In a general exchange some quantity of apples are available to all 
qualified claimants (say,  all  registered  voters)  at  some location  (the court- 
house) for some time (the week before elections). General exchanges usually 
are produced by large capital-intensive  units that permit many simultaneous 
general exchanges-thus,  the exchange (improved transport) is provided by a 
source (highway) that accommodates many travelers at once, and flood con- 
trol typically is provided by a dam that protects all who live downstream. 
In an efficient production of votes the ratio of  marginal production costs of 
direct and general  exchanges must equal the ratio of perceived sale values. 
Political changes can occur in the form of  products provided or in how they 
are provided. Political changes can be prompted by alterations in voters’ val- 
ues, by shifts in perceived or collectible values, and by shifts in the costs of 
possible exchanges. As  the output of a political  firm changes, organization 
and types of employees might change. For instance, a political firm organized 
to collect cash from government  contractors  might need different  form and 
people than one organized to deliver quality education. A political firm adept 
at trash  removal  might  not  be  adept at obtaining  intergovernmental  subsi- 
dies.21 
15.3  The Model Applied to Patronage 
Our model helps explain the rise and fall of patronage.  In our vision, the 
principal jobs of patronage employees were to:  1) search out voters, identify 
their preferences, and communicate an offer to them (patronage workers had 
to work in the many languages of illiterate voters); 2) make politicians’ prom- 
ises credible by befriending voters; 3) monitor votes; and 4) distribute largesse 
to those  deserving  “in  the different ways they need  help . . . quarters . . . 
clothes . . . a job.”22  Plunkitt of  Tammany Hall said that to accomplish these 
tasks “you have to go among the people, see them and be seen. I know every 
man, woman, and child in the . . . District.  . . . I know what they like and 
what they don’t like, what they are strong at and what they are weak in, and 
French them by approachin’ at the right side.”23  The Chicago machine of the 
1960s resembles the Tammany  machine  of  a century  earlier; in it  a “good 
21. For further discussion and graphical analysis, see Joseph D. Reid, Jr., and Michael M. 
Kurth, “Public Employees in Political Firms: Part A. The Patronage Era,” Public Choice. 59 
(Dec. 1988). pp. 253-62. 
22. Riordon, Plunkirt of  Tammany Hall, pp. 27-28. 
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precinct captain spends his evenings visiting his neighbors, doing chores at 
ward  headquarters, traveling to and from city hall on errands, and talking 
politics  .” 24 
The patronage machine worked well because the poor, polyglot voters in 
machine wards  were  served  efficiently by  patronage workers. Poor voters 
mostly needed help coping: insurance against unemployment, bad health, and 
scrapes with the law; direction to housing; assistance with forms; and the like. 
However, many of these needs are subject to self-serving misrepresentations: 
“I  am too sick to work,” “I cannot find suitable work,” or “I am still hungry” 
may not be reported truthfully. Therefore, reliefs may be oversupplied unless 
closely monitored and adjusted. 
The decision to monitor depends upon  the cost of  monitoring versus the 
cost of  oversupply. Close monitoring is more likely if voters’ wants can be 
supplied discriminatorily, because the profits from discrimination underwrite 
the costs of monitoring. Among the poor, profit from discrimination is usually 
plausible. For instance, supplying health care requested or needed by  a voter 
depends upon the degree of  sickness and the ability of family to care for the 
sick. For any degree of relief, the income, food, and housing needed depend 
upon family size and standards. Discrimination requires policing the resale of 
remedies, which a close monitor can do. 
When providing direct relief, patronage workers need to be able to assure 
the poor that relief will be delivered when wanted, because direct relief cannot 
be stockpiled. The means employed is trust. In getting close enough to moni- 
tor his voters and profitably discriminate among them, the patronage monitor 
becomes known well enough to be trusted. Finally, close monitoring is more 
likely if political talk must be carried out in different languages. For, if  the 
politician must talk Italian on one block and Polish on another, he needs many 
spokespersons who can monitor as they communicate door to door. 
Considering together moral hazard, discrimination in supply, assurance of 
supporters, and neighborhood scale economies in political discourse and de- 
livery, it is plausible that direct supply of political payoffs could accomplish 
efficiently all of the transactions required for political exchange in poor, poly- 
glot wards. The ward heeler who lived in the neighborhood and continually 
made its rounds, attended its churches and funerals, brought a turkey to the 
injured and found a job for the recovered-in  sum, who spoke his neighbors’ 
language and shared their ways-could  thereby discern their wants and gain 
their 
Because he  knew  his voters well,  he  needed to pay  them no more than 
needed for their votes, and he knew he could count on their repaying votes at 
elections. Because he was required to carry communications between politi- 
24. Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, p. 119. 
25. Cornwell, “Bosses, Machines, and Ethnic Groups,” p. 31. See also Banfield and Wilson, 
City Politics, pp. 117-19; John Petrocik, “Voting in a Machine City, Chicago, 1975,”  Ethnicity, 8 
(1981), pp. 320-40; and Riordon, Plunkitr ofTommany Hull, pp. 90-93. 434  Joseph D. Reid, Jr., and Michael M. Kurth 
cians and voters,  the patronage worker could efficiently carry political prod- 
ucts to voters. Not surprisingly, machines  won elections by giving the poor 
new immigrants to urban areas not just jobs but a broader “security from the 
uncertainties of their existence” directly.26  Thus, our translation of  Plunkitt’s 
description of a patronage worker’s work is talk to every voter individually 
(because each speaks a different language), learn how to buy each vote most 
cheaply, buy votes by promising and, when pressed, delivering payment, and 
collect repayments from voters. 
But direct intermediaries are not efficient with all voters. Rich voters save 
to provide for their own needy days. Rich voters want income-elastic services 
from government.  Even today, clean parks and speedy transport are the de- 
mands of  the wealthy,  not the  Although these demands could be met 
directly-trails  could be swept ahead of  rich hikers and bearers could carry 
rich travelers over rough terrain-scale  economies favor the general provision 
of such wants from a source prepared in advance and consumed  as wanted, 
especially since the user-furnished  complements to consumption (a vacation 
or an auto) successfully discriminate between rich and poor. The way to riches 
generally  requires  literacy  and  articulateness, so the  rich  can  be  reached 
through mass media and can make their wants known without intermediaries. 
In the patronage  era, the rich  were a homogeneous group of  white Anglo- 
Saxon Protestants who could be communicated  with generally and surveyed 
statistically. Thus, a patronage worker was not an efficient means to find, as- 
sure, monitor, and distribute political payoffs to the rich. 
15.4  The Historical Record 
15.4.1  State and Federal Governments 
History amply supports the distinction between the heterogeneous,  inartic- 
ulate poor and the homogeneous rich as determining the extent of patronage. 
Before its postbellum urban flowering, patronage arose in the New York state 
government. Patronage suited New York in the early 1800s, because many of 
the  state’s western  cities  and hamlets were  sufficiently isolated to preclude 
general communication and sufficiently heterogeneous economically to make 
specific and discriminatory provision of political assistance worthwhile.  Pa- 
tronage came to the federal government  as the westward migration isolated, 
made heterogeneous, and dispersed  the national  electorate.** The heteroge- 
26. Fred Greenstein, “The Changing Pattern of Urban Party Politics,” Annals of  the American 
Academy of  Political and Social Science: City Bosses and Political Machines,  353 (May 1964). 
pp.  1-13. 
27. Thomas E. Borcherding and Robert T. Deacon,  “The Demand for the Services of  Non- 
Federal Governments,” American Economic Review,  62 (Dec. 1972), pp. 897-98,  calculate an 
income elasticity for parks of  2.7. 
28. For the facts of federal patronage see Lee Benson, The Concept of  Jacksonian Democracy 
(Princeton,  1961); and Kass, Politics in New York. For the heterogeneity of  population, consider 
the increasing percentage of  the population living outside of  old coastal areas (the New England, 435  The Rise and Fall of  Urban Political Patronage Machines 
neous communities and regions of New York, and then of the United States, 
were analogous to the neighborhoods of the patronage cities. Votes could be 
bought cheaply with specific remedies (dam this river, remove these Indians, 
provide transport links to this entrep6t) that had to be made known (difficult 
in the cities because of language, and in the countryside because of distance), 
satisfied  efficiently  (difficult  because  of  voters’  self-serving requests  for 
more), and collected for (beforehand, which required voters’ to trust the polit- 
ical firm, or after, which required the firm to present its bills and watch their 
payment-but  in either case required some political intermediary and monitor 
on the spot). 
The decline of  federal patronage was  prompted by  changing (increasing) 
homogeneity among those who demanded governmental services and spurred 
by falls in the cost of communicating with voters and interest groups with new 
technologies. The exclusion of  the South from national political importance 
after the Civil War  made the national electorate much more homogeneous. 
The desire of  the North and West to develop the trans-Mississippi Midwest 
was fulfilled with railroads, land-grant colleges, agricultural research stations, 
and so forth. At the federal level, regional economic interests evolved into 
national line-of-business interests: shipping and entrep6t interests, financial 
interests, mercantile interests, and others. The ported rim of the country re- 
organized from regional interests into clustered lines of  specialized commer- 
cial interests that  spilled over congressional district lines. The agricultural 
interiors reorganized from locational interests to crop interests that similarly 
outgrew congressional district limits: the old and new Souths became more 
completely the cotton interest,  and the newly  franchised trans-Mississippi 
Midwest became the grains interest. Thus, political outcomes demanded from 
the federal government increasingly became transregional demands for pro- 
tection from specific ruinous imports, or subsidization of specific products, or 
alleviation of  broadly impacting ills, such as price instabilities newly intro- 
duced by interlinked and internationalized 
Political outcomes that crossed district lines could be supplied more effi- 
ciently through general rather than direct means. A general tariff was cheaper 
than direct reliefs. Direct reliefs had to reach specific producers in specific 
congressional districts.  They  might  take the  form of  the  purchase  of  the 
Middle Atlantic, and South Atlantic census regions) an estimate of heterogeneity. It is a lower 
bound estimate, in light of our attribution of Middle Atlantic New York’s patronage under Van 
Buren to its within-state heterogeneity. But this lower bound estimate, percentage of population 
outside old areas, increases steadily while patronage comes to the federal government; the per- 
centage of  population outside old coastal areas is 5.8 in 1800, 22.7 in 1820, 37.2 in 1840, and 
49.0 in  1860 (calculated from Jonathan  Hughes, American Economic Hisrory [Glenview, Ill., 
19871, table5.1, p. 96). 
29. For discussions of the rising demand from the middle class for protection from change and 
exploitation, see Link and McCormick, Progressivism; Robert A. McGuire, “Economic Causes 
of Late Nineteenth Century Agrarian Unrest,” Journal ofEconomic History, 41 (Dec. 1981), pp, 
835-52;  and Anne Mayhew, “A Reappraisal of the Causes of Farm Protest in the United States, 
1870-1900,”  Journal ofEconomic History, 32 (June 1972), pp. 464-75. 436  Joseph D. Reid, Jr., and Michael M. Kurth 
import-competing good for federal stores. A producer with plants in several 
congressional districts could easily claim hardship in one district by hiding his 
prosperity  in another.  Lacking the proper reference comparisons and exper- 
tise, a district patronage worker probably could not gauge the needs of  manu- 
facturers as well as those  of  voters.  More  efficiently, the  prosperity  of  the 
industry  would  monitor  the  adequacy  of  general  relief,  and  competition 
within the industry would stretch relief as far as possible. Likewise, midwest- 
em farmers could be protected from fluctuating costs and prices by regulations 
and laws enacted  in Washington;  general means,  rather  than through  direct 
remunerations which would be more costly. Trade associations and cartels that 
developed  after the Civil War  allowed distant politicians  to identify  and  to 
communicate with urban commercial interests without the help of intermedi- 
aries. 
New  communications  technology further favored the substitution of  gen- 
eral for direct political exchanges particularly at the state and federal levels of 
government. The advent of the telegraph and telephone  and increased news- 
paper  circulation  lowered  the cost of  communicating with  the government. 
The federal and state government were relatively more affected than local gov- 
ernments, and richer, more educated voters were more affected than poorer, 
less educated voters. Between  1869 and  1899, telegraph messages increased 
sevenfold. They increased another threefold  by  1929. Telephones per thou- 
sand population  increased elevenfold  between  1880 and  1899, and another 
elevenfold between  1899 and  1929. Illiteracy among native whites fell from 
8.7 percent (or 3.2 million) in  1880 to 4.6 percent (2.6 million) in 1900, and 
to  1.6 percent  (1.5 million) in  1930. Newspaper  circulation per household 
rose fourfold over the period.31 
Accordingly,  federal  and  state  governments  substituted  general  political 
outcomes for direct outcomes, and broad economic outcomes for specific and 
local  outcomes. Establishment  of  the  Interstate  Commerce Commission  in 
1887 was one manifestation of the move from direct and local political out- 
comes to broad and general political  outcomes.  Reform of  federal customs 
houses and post offices was another. The new jousting between the president 
and Congress to control federal employment was a third. With the spread of 
steam  and  then  electricity,  manufacturing  firms  tended  to  locate  in  urban 
areas. With improved transport,  management techniques, and synergistic ur- 
ban growth, retail  sales and general commercial activities centered in larger 
30. Olson, Logic of  Collective Action, argues convincingly that trade groups that can withhold 
private benefits to secure payments for association-public benefits will secure such benefits more 
successfully. The increasing ease of communicating with commercial interests generally (from a 
distance) is evidenced by their growth in size: production employees per manufacturing establish- 
ment increased from 8.1 in 1869 to 10, counting all manufacturing establishments; to 22, exclud- 
ing hand and neighborhood industries in  1899; and to 40 in  1929 (calculated from Bureau of the 
Census, Historical Statistics of  the UnitedStutes [Washington, D.C., 19601, series P4 divided by 
P1, p. 409). 
31. Calculated from Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of rhe  United States (Washing- 
ton, D.C.,1960), series R2 and R7, pp. 480-81;  R45 and R53, pp. 484-85;  H409, p. 214; R176, 
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urban  locations.  Managers of  these dispersed enterprises came to depend 
more  and  more  on  speedy  mail  and  customs  clearings.  Spanning many 
congressional districts and even states, merchants and manufacturers effec- 
tively communicated to the federal government that they wanted speedier ser- 
vice. Because speedier service would also raise the vote-payoff from richer 
and more literate consumers, the federal government began to separate pro- 
duction of  these services from kickbacks by  patronage appointees in large 
cities. That is, the federal government turned from direct to general political 
exchange to secure the votes and cash of a growing constituency, the rich and 
the newly insistent commercial interests. 
The movement from direct toward general political exchange was acceler- 
ated by  scale economies that became possible as the homogeneity of  voters 
increased and became affordable as ease of  communicating with voters im- 
proved. The disappearing frontier and the spread of literacy and media outside 
of the largest (more immigrant) cities played a role. Economic changes, more- 
over, led middle class voters to place more weight on securing their wealth. 
On  the demand  side, then,  rising  incomes led  more voters to prefer  self- 
insurance and income-elastic political payoffs. Where interests were united, 
reliefs could be provided most cheaply through regulatory agencies and laws 
enacted in Washington and distributed generally through a uniform nation- 
wide system of justice. So federal (and later state) politicians began to disen- 
gage from the hierarchical arrangement of  party patronage that had  linked 
cities to higher governments since Jackson. 
Presidents became spokesmen for the federal government in discussions 
with special interests with nationwide constituencies. Urban congressmen be- 
gan to deal with urban interests through trade groups and media without the 
aid of  state and local intermediaries. Rural representatives experienced the 
least change  in  communicating and  collecting from  constituents,  because 
farmers stayed put. The coalescence of district interests into crop interests did 
move rural congressmen away from patronage exchange with rural constitu- 
ents, but efficiency did not dictate that rural congressmen replace direct with 
general political exchange as rapidly. In  consequence, the president, allied 
with urban senators and members of Congress, pushed federal reform against 
recalcitrant rural interests.32 In  response to rising  homogeneity and falling 
communication costs, federal patronage began to give way to merit evaluation 
in the  1880s in urban activities directed at those who were richer and more 
literate. Merit employees represented 10.5 percent of all federal employees in 
1884, 25.5 percent in 1894, 53.0 percent in  1904, 60.6 percent in  1914, and 
79.7 percent in 1924.33  Federal patronage first shrank from tasks that served a 
32. For example, members of Congress representing urban entrep6ts were significantly more 
likely to  support the Pendleton Act initiating civil service. See regression results of Ronald N. 
Johnson and Gary D. Libecap, “Patronage to Merit: Political Change in the Federal Government 
Labor Force” (manuscript, University of  Arizona, Mar.  1990). table  1, p. 27. 
33. Federal employment grew fourfold over this time, so that the absolute number of federal 
patronage employees did not decline until after 1914. See Extension of Competitive Civil Service, 
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newly insistent clientele, as when larger post offices and customs houses were 
put under civil service as members of  the business community pressured for 
prompt and secure service.34  Some reform reflected rivalries within the federal 
government, but rivalries produced by the waxing and waning importance of 
components of  the constitutionally constrained government in political sup- 
ply, rather than rivalries between reform and corrupt political  antagonist^.^^ 
More slowly, but for similar reasons, patronage also began to shrink in the 
states. State patronage workers were withdrawn first from tasks that served 
nonvoters. In  1883, for instance, the state of New York passed a civil service 
bill which “applied to officers employed in  connection with canals, public 
works, prisons, asylums, and reformatories.”36 
15.4.2  Urban Patronage 
In contrast, urban patronage grew fastest between 1884 and  1900. Brown 
and Halaby’s study of  thirty large cities indicates that urban patronage take- 
overs grew 200 percent between 1884 and 1892, and competition among con- 
tending patronage machines rose 50 percent. Patronage politics prevailed in 
80 percent of  their cities in  1892 and 73 percent in  1900.37  From aggregate 
data it is arguable that cities filled with polyglot poor voters and jostling and 
growing  commerce  found  it  efficient  to  move  toward  direct  political  ex- 
changes. Voters poured into cities. As Table  15.1 reports, cities boomed. Be- 
tween  1870 and  1900, the U.S.  population increased 97 percent, with the 
foreign-born population increasing 86 percent, while total and foreign-born 
population in the thirty sample cities increased 179 percent and 104 percent, 
respectively. Between 1880 and 1900, the number of manufacturing establish- 
ments in the United States rose  102 percent, manufacturing capital rose 252 
percent, population rose 51 percent, and the manufacturing work force rose 
94 percent. In the one hundred principal cities, manufacturing establishments 
rose  138 percent, capital rose 261 percent, population rose 89 percent, and 
the work force rose 84 percent. In the thirty sample cities, establishments rose 
144 percent, capital rose 279 percent, population rose  89 percent, and the 
work force grew 73 percent. Population of  the one hundred principal cities 
was 18 percent of U.S.  population in 1880 and 23 percent in 1900. Work force 
per establishment averaged 69 percent greater in cities than in the nation in 
1880 and  38  percent  larger in  1900. In  cities,  manufacturing capital per 
Stares and Selected Foreign Counfries, 94th Cong., S.S. (Washington, D.C.,  1976). table  1, p. 
305. For details of the Pendleton Act, see Congressional Record, 47th Cong., 2d sess., 1883, pp. 
34. Skowronek, New American Srate, pp. 69,72-74,  passim; Mandelbaum, Tweed’s New York, 
35. Skowronek, New American Stare, pp. 62-74. 
36. Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, p. 257. 
37. Brown and Halaby, “Machine Politics,” fig.  1, p.  598. We identify competition among 
contending machines with “a factional pattern, where several ward-level machines compete with 
each other and ‘regular’ political groups for city power” (ibid., p. 590). 
403-7. 
pp. 155-57. Table 15.1  Statistics for Selected Cities and the United States: 1870, 1880, 1890, 
and 1900 
Item 
Year  Percentage Increase 
1870  1880  1890  1900  1870-1900  1880-90  1880-1900 
Thirty-  Cities 
Patronage (%)  52  67  70  73  40  4  4 
Population (000)  4,575  6,753  9,117  12,754  179  35  40 
Foreign born (OOO)  1,779  2,312  3,102  3,647  105  34  58 
Manufacturing estab- 
lishments (OOO)  -  58  126  140  -  118  144 
Manufacturing capital 
($000,000)  -  981  2,581  3,714  -  163  279 
Work force (000)  -  1,063  1,650  1,844  -  55  73 
One Hundred Cities 
Population (OOO)  6,683  9,131  13,139  17,233  158  44  89 
Manufacturing estab- 
lishments (000)  -  78  168  186  -  115  139 
Manufacturing capital 
($OOO,OOO)  -  1,385  3,524  5,001  -  155  26 1 
Work force (000)  -  1,431  2,310  2,639  -  61  84 
United States 
Population (000)  38,558  50,156  62,662  75,995  97  25  52 
Manufacturing estab- 
Manufacturing capital 
($OOo,OOO)  -  2,790  6,525  9,814  -  134  252 
Work force (OOO)  2,046  2,733  4,252  5,306  159  56  94 
Foreign born (OOO)  5,567  6,680  9,250  10,341  86  38  55 
lishments (000)  252  254  355  512  103  40  102 
Sources: Percentage of cities with patronage machines is calculated from M. Craig Brown and Charles 
N. Halaby, “Machine Politics in America, 1870-1945,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History,  17 (Winter 
1987). fig. 1, p. 598. The thirty cities are identified in Brown and Halaby, “Machine Politics,” fn. 3, pp. 
588-89.  The thirty cities population and foreign born  are from Bureau of the Census, Ninth  Census: 
Statistics of Population of the United Stares (Washington, D.C., 1872), vol.  1, table 8, p. 380; Bureau 
of the Census, Compendium of the Tenth Census: I880 (Washington, D.C., 1883). part  1, pp. 452-63, 
542; Bureau of the Census, Compendium of the Eleventh Census: I890 (Washington, D.C., 1894), part 
I, pp. 44-5  1, 540-79;  and Bureau of the Census, Twelfth Census: Report on Population of the United 
Stares (Washington, D.C., 1902), vol.  I, part  1, pp. 609-46.  The thirty cities manufacturing data are 
from Bureau of the Census, Compendium (1880), pp. 379-80;  Bureau of the Census, Report on Manu- 
facturing Industries in the United States, Eleventh Census (Washington, D.C., 1895), part 2, pp. 8-13; 
and Bureau of the Census, Report on Manufactures, Twelfth Census (Washington, D.C., 1902). vol. 7, 
part  1, pp. 992-1003.  One hundred  cities population for  1870 is the population  of  fifty-two principal 
cities plus half of the population of the next  116 cities from Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics 
of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1975). series A 58-64 and A 44-50, pp.  11-12.  The remainder 
of the one hundred cities data are from Bureau of the Census, Manufactures (1902), p. ccxix. U.S. total 
population is calculated from Bureau of the Census, Historical  Statistics, series A  119, p. 15; series A 
105, 112, p.  14. The numbers of manufacturing establishments for 1870 are from ibid., series P  1, p. 
666. The size of the work force is calculated from discussion in ibid., p. 653, series P 3-5, wage earners 
estimate, multiplied by  the average ratio of  Bureau of the Census, Manufactures (1902), wage earners, 
p. ccxix, to Historical Statistics discussion estimate,  1880-1900.  Remaining data are from Bureau of 
the Census, Manufactures (1902), p. ccxix. 440  Joseph D. Reid, Jr., and Michael M. Kurth 
worker doubled, while in the nation it increased only 85 percent between 1880 
and 1900. 
The  1880 to  1900 comparisons understate  the  political  impacts  of  the 
growth rates. The urban centers’ gain in poorer and foreign residents, and the 
centers’ expansion of bigger manufacturers  which employed these new resi- 
dents, was dramatically higher in the earlier decades. Also, the proportion of 
foreign born or native born of foreign parents (arguably a better measure of 
heterogeneity)  was dramatically  higher  than  the proportion  of  foreign born 
alone. In 1890 in the thirty sample cities, 31 percent were foreign born but 71 
percent had at least one foreign-born parent. Finally, the flow of manufactur- 
ing capital and jobs to the cities was at its relative peak in the 1880s. Thus, 
urban patronage grew in cities that became most heterogeneous  and accom- 
modated most rapidly to changed economic circumstances. 
Later, gradual withdrawal of patronage and the rise of  general political out- 
comes was observed in municipalities where the interests of voters and busi- 
ness overlapped. Commission government and at-large elections, well-known 
instruments of political reform, were adopted in midwestern farm entrepbts 
which focused on transshipment of a main crop and servicing of  surrounding 
farmers. The homogeneity of  their citizens, of  their economic interests, and 
of alternative towns meant that voters and commercial interests could be ad- 
dressed and responded to generally, or could move Tiebout-style away from 
inefficiency. Therefore legislation rather than corruption predominated in fa- 
cilitating farm-town commerce.38 
In older and heterogeneous  cities the most profitable way to accommodate 
business remained having patronage workers who sold variances individually 
and bought votes with political fav01-s.~~  In these cases blanket accommoda- 
tion of industrial modernization  was blocked by established voting groups or 
by the influence of unique resources (such as a port, railhead, or an agglom- 
eration of  people) where locational rents retarded the flight of voters and tax- 
payers from political inefficiencies and inequities. 
Even in the heyday of municipal patronage, “no city [was] . . . composed 
exclusively of  wards filled with voters responsive to . . . the dispensation of 
favors.  In addition  to the  ‘river wards’ there  are others, called in Chicago 
‘newspaper wards’ and in New York  ‘silk-stocking’ districts, which . . . re- 
spond[ed]  much less, if  at all, to the infusion of  patr~nage.”~~  In rich  and 
homogeneous wards, political machines ran low-key operations or acquiesced 
to a reform representative, so long as the reformer did not strive to expand his 
38. To see the focus of municipal reform among homogeneous farm entrep6ts. see Rice, fro- 
gressive Cities. pp. 52-7  I, especially table 4, pp. 54-55.  For choice of flight or reform as remedy 
to unwanted government, see Charles M. Tiebout, “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” Jour- 
nal ofPoliticalEconomy, 64 (Oct. 1956), pp. 416-24. 
39. See table 6, “Social Characteristics of Cities of 25,000 or More by Adoption of Commission 
Form of Government, 1913,” in Rice, Progressive Cities, p. 89. 
40. Wilson, “Patronage,” p. 374. See also Leonard White, reported in Paul P.  Van Riper, His- 
tory of  the UniredSrutes Chi[  Service (White Plains, NY, 1958). p. 27. 441  The Rise and Fall of  Urban Political Patronage Machines 
representation or to curtail the activities of  the machine in its wards.41  Ma- 
chines or reformers won richer and more literate neighborhoods with income- 
elastic  general  exchanges:  reform  opponents  of  Tweed’s  Tammany  Hall 
wanted “‘a good police  force,  good pavements, substantial docks, a well- 
lighted and healthy city, a good fire department, economic expenditure and 
honest and efficient administration,’  ”42  so Tweed, to disarm them, supplied 
the high-income wards of upper Manhattan with “new streets, water mains, 
sewers, parks, and streetcar lines.”43  The poor neighborhoods difficult to com- 
municate with  or to monitor except individually were won with  direct ex- 
changes. Tweed supplied poor and immigrant wards welfare-housing,  jobs, 
and protection from catastrophe, as well as beer for voters. In the 1960s, pa- 
tronage Mayor Richard J. Daley placated reformers in Chicago by inaugurat- 
ing “street cleaning, street lighting, road building, a new airport, and a con- 
vention hall.” For businesses he made Chicago the city that worked. Daley 
won votes from poor wards with “turkeys and hods of coal” and other direct 
helps to make the neighborhoods livable.44 
In sum, urban history supports our prediction that if economic outcomes 
are shared, competitive political firms will provide them generally, but if they 
are contested, political firms will sell economic outcomes directly and indi- 
vidually. In  fact, a sizable portion of  the electorate wanted the same things 
(cheap incarceration of inmates, fast passage through customs, speedy mail, 
good roads) and could be trusted not to abuse their provision, and communi- 
cation with that electorate became cheap (by media) and sure (because wants 
were homogeneous and  spokespersons were identified), so employees who 
specialized in  performing tasks replaced patronage employees who special- 
ized in representing specific neighborhoods. Patronage declined as the relative 
value of general exchanges rose and the cost declined.45 
15.5  Other Explanations 
The decline of  patronage is not usually attributed to changes in  the effi- 
ciency of  various political transactions. The main explanation is the disap- 
41. Banfield and Wilson, Cify  Politics, pp.  116-21. 
42. From newspaper quote by Mandelbaum, Tweeds  New York, p. 179, of the son of the reform 
43. Shefter, Polirical Crisis. p. 16. 
44.  Banfield and Wilson, Cizy Politics. pp. 124, 118-19. 
45. In a seminar discussion, Gary Becker asked why, given the increased incomes of  govern- 
ments, is there not more direct welfare in poor areas and more general welfare in rich areas? It is 
a good question. Although the answer is not critical to our thesis, we think Becker is incorrect. 
The minimum winning coalition gets the bulk of  payoffs from governments. Currently that coali- 
tion consists of middle-class voters and, for cash payers, small producers such as farmers in the 
countryside  and  contractors  in  cities. Therefore,  what  looks  like payoffs to the  poor-food 
stamps, in-kind relief, housing developments, and the like-are  principally payoffs to the farmers 
and contractors who make and replace the payoffs. Indeed, even payoffs to the middle class are 
twisted further than technology dictates toward being general so that they can be contracted out as 
capital construction, to win contractors’ votes and to insulate the payoff from repeal. See Kenneth 
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pearance of  foreign stock in the population (produced by the stoppage of  im- 
migration during World War I and subsequent immigration reforms) and the 
assimilation of immigrants’ progeny. This explanation is often supplemented 
by lesser, supporting reasons for the rise of the civil service. 
One supplemental explanation for the end of patronage is that civil service 
arose to protect faithful political employees from hostile successor administra- 
tions. Some growth did occur this way.46  But not much because the plan would 
encourage patronage employees to work for the quick defeat of their patron to 
gain their sinecures. If  the affected employees were not expecting job gifts, 
then giving gifts would not influence their loyalty beforehand and would ren- 
der their loyalty unusable and “unsalable” in the future. 
A related explanation is that transformations from patronage to civil service 
represented a scorched earth policy by lame-duck administrations.  By trans- 
ferring its patronage workers to classified merit lists, an outgoing administra- 
tion  hindered  its successor from rewarding  its own workers  and further re- 
duced  the efficiency  of  services  provided  by  the new  administration.  The 
implicit contention  is that the immediate value of scorched earth offsets the 
future loss from no subsequent patronage  appointments.  Even if  there were 
inconvenience  to the successor administration,  there is little reason to think 
that lame-duck  transfers  to merit lists would  survive. The incoming winner 
has no reason  to honor such transfers and could repeal them.  Repeals have 
happened. President  Eisenhower, upon his inauguration,  withdrew civil ser- 
vice protection  from  134,000 federal incumbents  blanketed in by  President 
Truman.  Earlier,  congressional  Democrats and  Republicans  were outraged 
when President Cleveland increased merit appointments by a third in  1896 in 
a “vengeful  act of  a President  whose party  support had di~solved.”~’  Upon 
taking office, President McKinley restored a third (9,000) of these positions 
to patronage, then federal employment expansions relieved pressure for fur- 
ther  restoration^.^^ It has been suggested that civil service sinecures arose not 
to influence the efforts of public employees but to win their  But econ- 
ometrically modeling favors for votes in state legislatures,  we find that gov- 
ernments with large pluralities do not further reward voting  coalition^.^^ Thus, 
Shepsle,  Barry  Weingast,  and Christopher  Johnson,  “The Political Economy of  Benefits and 
Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics,” Journal of  Political Economy. 89 (Aug. 
1981), pp. 642-64. 
46. Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, History of  Civil Service, pp. 181-85. 
47. Skowronek, New American State, p. 73. 
48. Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, History ofCivilService, pp. 268-69. 
49. Argued by  Gordon Tullock, “Dynamic Hypothesis on Bureaucracy,” Public  Choice, 19 
(Fall 1974), pp. 127-31,  and accepted by Amy H. Dalton, “A Theory of the Organization of State 
and Local Government Employees,” Journal of  Labor Research, 3 (Spring 1982), pp. 163-77. 
50. We found that a dominant party rewards marginal (potentially swing) constituency members 
in  inverse proportion to the margin of  dominance.  A barely dominant party pays its marginal 
voters a lot, while a hugely dominant party pays little. See Joseph D. Reid, Jr., and Michael M. 
Kurth, “The Organization of  State and  Local Government Employees: Comment,” Journal  of 
Labor Research, 5 (Spring 1984), pp.  191-200;  and Joseph D. Reid, Jr., and Michael M. Kurth, 443  The Rise and Fall of  Urban Political Patronage Machines 
implied transfers of wealth from politicians to employees are too benevolent 
in theory and too rare in fact to explain the transformation of patronage work- 
ers to civil servants. 
Another supplemental explanation for the end of patronage is that patron- 
age employees left  as their opportunity  wages rose, while  reform required 
scarce merit qualifications for all but the most unattractive  That rising 
opportunity wages reduced the supply of patronage workers implies that the 
supply of patronage workers shrank relative to demand, so that the number of 
people available to register voters and canvass neighborhoods fell. But, typi- 
cally, such patronage workers were uneducated. Furthermore, their jobs today 
are easily filled by  volunteer^.^^ Thus, it is unlikely that opportunity wages of 
rank-and-file patronage workers rose in the period. The more likely explana- 
tion  is  that  demand  for patronage  workers rather  than  their  supply  shifted 
back. 
Now let us directly address the traditional explanation for reform, that re- 
form “was the effort to restore a type of economic individualism and political 
democracy that was widely believed . . . to have been destroyed by the great 
corporation and the corrupt political machine.”53  We do not disagree that agi- 
tation against electoral corruption and advocacy linking corruption with im- 
migration policy existed. It is plausible that public pressure for reform began 
to build after the Civil War. The demise of  slavery freed the intelligentsia to 
fulminate against other national shortfalls, and the fires of repeated scandals 
illuminated patronage governments as prominent shortfalls. When President 
Garfield was shot by a would-be spoilsman, it is possible that reformers’ zeal 
became so frenzied that reform became electorally irresistible, even if (as we 
argue) the mass of voters did not much care.54  It is also possible that reform 
attracted political champions who saw it as a vehicle of successful advocacy, 
and thus as a career 
But the essence of the traditional explanation is that the “better” or “more 
American” voters compelled reform. We have already questioned this.  From 
public goods theory, we have argued that few voters would rationally press for 
“The Contribution of Exclusive Representation to Union Strength,” Journal ofhbor  Research. 5 
(Fall 1984), pp. 391-412. 
5 I. Sorauf, “Patronage,” p. 30; Greenstein, “The Pattern of Urban Politics,” pp. 8-9;  Cornwell, 
“Bosses,  Machines,  and Ethnic Groups,” p. 34; Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 
Hisrory ofcivil Service, chap. 4. 
52. Rhodes, “Incentives in Political Machines,” p. 37, documents that wages of contemporary 
machine employees are commonly below opportunity earnings. 
53. Richard Hofstadter, The Age ofReform, p. 5. 
54. Olson, The Logic of  Collective Action, convincingly argues that a committed few can win 
political changes. 
55. Reid, “Understanding Political Events,” argues that leaders can forecast the evolution of 
support for and of  acquiescence  in  political outcomes and will  champion outcomes becoming 
popular in order to demonstrate leadership. Theodore Roosevelt is a likely example of a would-be 
leader championing reform to demonstrate leadership. Reid emphasizes that sustainable political 
outcomes, such as reform, generally are not unique. 444  Joseph D. Reid, Jr., and Michael M. Kurth 
reform. In fact, across and within governments reforms came piecemeal (first 
this bureau, then that, was transformed to merit employment), which is incon- 
sistent with the idea that an irresistible notion  swept the country. Indeed,  a 
respectable theory argues that members of the business community led reform 
to block rather than to extend democracy, which questions the role of voters 
in stimulating reform.56 
Attacks by reformers and displacement of patronage politicians do not gain- 
say our conclusion that reform represented the reorganization of governments 
to govern more profitably. Producers of political exchanges that did not adjust 
were displaced by more efficient rivals.57  At different locations and times, sup- 
ply efficiencies differed. Reorganizations and supplier substitutions were cha- 
otic. Leonard White noted in 1933 that “most of the change [towards the merit 
system] has been, relatively speaking, undirected  growth. Especially the ex- 
tension of organized groups of  public officials and employees,  some with a 
highly  professional  point of  view  and  others with  interests primarily  of an 
economic  nature,  has proceeded  without  much  public  notice  and  certainly 
without recognized leadership apart from that associated with each group.”58 
Stephen Skowronek similarly concluded that “between  1877 and  1900, the 
[federal] merit  service failed  to attain internal coherence.  . . . It remained 
inchoate.” 59 
Ari  Hoogenboom  concluded  that “the  scope of  the  [Pendleton  Act] was 
determined  . . . by the political potential of the offices themselves.”60 For all 
reform, we conclude the same. We accept the supply-side argument made by 
the father of  federal reform, Senator Jenckes,  in  1867, “that by decreasing 
patronage obligations, Members of Congress could save countless hours now 
spent dealing with office seekers and then utilize the time for more important 
duties.”61 Sixteen  years  later,  a  majority  of  his  congressional  colleagues 
agreed.  At  different  times, in  different  places,  but  for the  same reason- 
changing costs and values of  general relative to direct political exchanges- 
56. See Samuel P. Hays,  “Business Elite and the Centralization of  Decision-Making,” and 
James Weinstein, “Businessmen and the City Commission and Manager Movements,” in Urban 
Bosses, Machines, and ProgressiveReformers,  Bruce M. Stave, ed. (Lexington, 1972). pp.  119- 
29, 129-43. 
57. See the description of Carmen DeSapio’s (failed) attempt to adapt Tammany Hall in Shefter, 
Political Crisis. Harvey Boulay and Alan DiGaetano, “Why Did Political Machines Disappear?” 
Journal of  Urban Hisrory,  12 (Nov.  1985). p. 37, agreeably attribute the replacement of  many 
machines to the inability to respond efficiently to newcomers. Also see Kevin T. Deno and Ste- 
phen L. Mehay, “Municipal Management Structure and Fiscal Performance: Do City Managers 
Make a Difference?’Southern  Economic Journal, 54 (Jan. 1987). pp. 627-39,  which reports that 
there is today no statistically significant difference in expenditures of  reform (city manager) and 
unreformed (council-mayor) municipal governments, other things equal. This contradicts the re- 
form assumptions (that structure matters or that reform indicates differences in the electorates), 
but is as our model predicts, that survivors in a competitive environment have the same supply 
cost. 
58. Leonard D. White, Trends in Public Adminisfrution (New York, 1933). p. 5. 
59. Skowronek, New American Stare, p. 78. 
60.  Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, p. 244. 
61. Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, History ofcivil Service, p. 127. 445  The Rise and Fall of Urban Political Patronage Machines 
other politicians agreed. In sum, politicians walked rather than were pushed 
away from patronage. 
15.6  Conclusion 
Patronage is the efficient means to effect direct political exchanges. Direct 
political exchange is favored when public wants are heterogeneous and prof- 
itably provided  discriminatorily,  and when it is hard to determine indirectly 
how people voted.  General political exchange is favored when public wants 
are sufficiently homogeneous to be learned and the necessary payment to be 
predicted  by  surveys or by communicating with special interest representa- 
tives, and when wants are satisfied efficiently by supply independent of receipt 
(as a park is built and available, independent of use). 
Patronage gives way when and where government becomes responsible for 
providing continuing services to general users rather than for sporadic favors 
to individuals. To  achieve a defensible level of competency at general produc- 
tion, appointment  and promotion  are entrusted to meritorious credentials: so 
much education, so much experience, and so on. Politicians are content to let 
“expert”  civil servants design  the details, with the benefit to the politicians 
that they are not accountable immediately, if ever, for civil servants’ produc- 
tion of general services malfunctions. 
Our analysis explains why the meritocracy of the founding fathers was re- 
placed with “Jacksonian democracy,” and why similar political machines later 
came to dominate the cities.  Machines were  successful  because  they  ex- 
changed services  and favors directly  for the  votes of lower socioeconomic 
groups. Public employees earned their pay by “turning out” the vote. What 
many decried as encouraging governmental inefficiency actually promoted ef- 
ficient service of myriad voters with diverse wants subject to moral hazard in 
representation.  That is why  machines were  the  rule only with  diverse and 
needy voters. 
Patronage fell because the political value of general services increased, not 
because of the efforts of reformers, even though reforms tended to reduce the 
cost of general services relative to direct services. To provide general services 
efficiently required  a new structure of incentives.  Public administration was 
professionalized,  and civil service boards were established to promote profes- 
sionalism. The civil service league replaced the political club, and the merit 
system dominated public-sector labor relations until the 1960~~~~ 
62. Our argument even explains the recent rise of militant unionism among public employees. 
When the costs of distantly monitored communication fell in  the late 1950s (with the advent of 
television, wide area telephone service, and computer-developed addresses), the federal govern- 
ment began to expand its domain at the expense of state and local governments. These govern- 
ments either encouraged or tolerated militant job actions by their employees to slow and redirect 
the federal expansion. State and local public employees  joined unions to get expert assistance with 
militancy. See Joseph  D. Reid, Jr., and Michael M. Kurth, “Union Militancy Among Public 
Employees: A Public Choice Hypothesis, Journal ofLabor Research, 5 (Winter 1990), pp. 1-23. 